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1. Introduction 
The history of the development and passage through Parliament of the Child Justice 
Act 75 of 2010 (the Act) has been reasonably well documented, and the various 
influences on the process of law making that preceded the Act have enjoyed 
considerable academic attention.1 
Various claims are made concerning the overall import and thrust of the legislation 
that was finally adopted. A non-governmental movement which developed around 
the Parliamentary processes2 has been at the centre many of these claims. The 
authors of this paper are intimately connected to this NGO movement, and one of us 
was the co-ordinator of the Child Justice Alliance until the end of 2008. We therefore 
declare at the outset our prior interest in depicting the envisaged new system as 
constituting a significant advance in human rights and constitutional terms over the 
ad hoc arrangements for children in trouble with the law that prevailed previously. 
                                                     
  J Sloth-Niesen. BA LLB (Stell) LLM (UCT) LLD (UWC), Professor, Faculty of Law, University of 
the Western Cape (jsloth-nielsen@uwc.ac.za). 
  J Gallinetti. BA LLB LLM (UCT) PhD (UWC), Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of the 
Western Cape (jgallinetti@uwc.ac.za). 
1 
 Sloth-Nielsen J The Role of International law in Juvenile Justice Reform in South Africa (LLD 
thesis UWC 2001); Skelton A The Influence of the Theory and Practice of Restorative Justice in 
South Africa with Special Reference to Child Justice  (LLD thesis UP 2006); Gallinetti J An 
Assessment of the Significance of the International Labour Organisation’s Convention 182 in 
South Africa with Specific Reference to the Instrumental se of Children in the Commission of 
Offences as a Worst Form of Child Labour (PhD thesis UWC 2008);  Skelton A "The South 
African Child Justice Bill: Transition as Opportunity" in Jensen E and Jepson J (eds) Juvenile 
Law Violators, Human Rights and the Development of New Juvenile Justice Systems (Hart 
Publishing: Oxford 2006); Skelton A and Bately M Charting Progress, Mapping the Future: 
Restorative Justice in South Africa (Restorative Justice Centre and Institute for Security Studies 
2006); Gallinetti J Getting to know the Child Justice Act  (Child Justice Alliance Cape Town 
2009). 
2 
 The Act was extensively debated in Parliament in two discrete periods: in 2003, under the 
chairpersonship of Johnny de Lange, MP, then heading the Portfolio Committee on Justice and 
Constitutional Development; and later in 2008, under the helm of Yunis Carriem MP after the Bill 
had been redrafted and debates around the newly tabled provisions were in effect re-opened.  
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It has been contended that the general thrust of the Child Justice Act renders it a 
meaningful attempt to give effect to South Africa’s constitutional and international law 
obligations, and that substantial compliance with the overarching norms relating to 
juvenile justice (as the field is termed internationally) has been brought about. 
Further, it has been argued that the Act ushers in a new era in the field of dispute 
resolution insofar as provision is made for restorative justice options as diversionary 
alternatives,3 and therefore that the Act is characterised by a restorative justice 
orientation. Third, it is alleged that the Act "Africanises" child justice proceedings 
through the incorporation of the values of ubuntu in its provisions and its preamble. 
Fourth, from the opposite side of the fence, as it were, detractors have from time to 
time suggested that the diversionary preference exhibited in the Act lets children "off 
the hook" and absolves them from responsibility for their criminal acts. The "just say 
sorry" reading of the Act as a whole views the Act’s scheme as a licence for lenience 
and an abdication of state responsibility for dealing with the aftermath of children’s 
criminal behaviour.4     
The paper commences with an examination of the various features of the Act that 
could be said to contribute to its African flavour. Thereafter, the significance of these 
features is contextualised within the overall framework of the criminal procedure 
provided for. The paper explores dispassionately whether the third and fourth claims 
referred to above, in particular, can truly be substantiated. This task also involves 
exploring the extent to which the second claim referred to above, namely that the Act 
furthers a restorative approach to child justice, is borne out.  
2. The Child Justice Act as an ‘Africanised’ statute 
2.1 The Preamble 
                                                     
3 
 Diversion of matters away from formal criminal proceedings is a central tenet of the new Act, 
forming a distinct chapter of the Act, and being strengthened procedurally through a variety of 
provisions aimed at ensuring that diversion is considered by justice system decision makers at 
various stages of the criminal procedure. See sections 41 and 42, and Chapter 8 of the Act.   
4 
 The title is based on the caption to a cartoon that appeared in a South African daily newspaper 
when the Child Justice Bill was first tabled in Parliament in 2003. 
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The first characteristic of the Act is an unusually long and detailed Preamble, 
reminiscent of a treaty or resolution of an international human rights organ.5 
Comprising fully 4 pages (with several bulleted lists interspersed - one needs to read 
the Preamble to get a full sense of the number of paragraphs involved) the Preamble 
covers considerable ground.  It alludes to the treatment of children under apartheid, 
where black children in particular did not have the "opportunity to live and act like 
children", and the overall aspirations of the Constitution regarding values such as 
social and economic justice and the provision of an improved quality of life for all. 
The constitutional protection of the rights of children is highlighted by reference to all 
of the section 28 rights that could have a bearing on children in the justice system;6 
yet the desire to replace existing statutory provisions which do not "address the 
plight of children in conflict with the law" with a system that "takes into account their 
vulnerability and needs" is expressly grounded in the "capacity, resource and other 
constraints which require a pragmatic and incremental strategy".7  
The Preamble then charts a series of aims and objectives of the new child justice 
system. Of relevance to this paper are the following: the aim of centralising diversion 
as an option for children in the criminal justice system (in accordance with the 
"values underpinning the Constitution and with our international obligations"); the aim 
of expanding and entrenching the principles of restorative justice (while ensuring 
children’s responsibility and their accountability for crimes committed); minimising 
the potential for re-offending through  placing increased emphasis on the effective 
rehabilitation and reintegration of children; balancing the interests of children and 
                                                     
5 
 These documents are also characterised by statements of principle prefaced by phrases such as 
"recognising that", "mindful that" and "acknowledging that"....  . 
6 
 Although not cited by section, the rights concerned are section 28(1)(g), 28(1)(b), 28(1)(d), and 
28(1)(e). Interestingly the constitutional right to legal representation is not referred to specifically, 
nor is the principle of the best interest of the child. See the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 for an 
elaborate expression of the principle of the best interests of the child, which is included in section 
7.  
7 
 This is not an ideal model for the legislative incorporation of a realistic and useful standard to 
which the state must adhere in the implementation of the legislation. Contrast this with section 4 
of the Children’s Act, which exhorts the state to implement the Act progressively to the maximum 
extent of available resources, realising that competing priorities exist. This latter provision has 
already enjoyed judicial recognition in the recent Nawongo judgement of the Free State High 
Court: National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations and 
Others v Member of the Executive Council for Social Development, Free State, unreported, case 
no. 1719/2010.  However, it must be noted that section 97 of the Child Justice Act provides a 
detailed framework for implementation. It requires policy directives, a national policy framework 
and monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the Act, for instance.   
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those of society and victims; and creating a system which in broad terms takes into 
account the long-term benefits of a less rigid criminal justice process that suits the 
needs of children in conflict with the law in appropriate cases. The specific 
innovations of the new procedure and their alleged compliance with South Africa’s 
treaty obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Charter) 
are then also detailed in the final page of the Preamble.  
Two obvious questions that arise are what the possible legal status of these 
righteous intentions, expressed in quasi-legislative form, might be, and the extent to 
which the actual legislative provisions bear out the stated objectives. The short 
answer to the first is that the Preamble at least in reality frames the context: it may 
be that the noble sentiment and background sketched are at most of vague 
interpretative value, and since each lofty aspiration is expressed with a fair degree of 
ambiguity, it is unlikely that the elegant wording will play much of a role in shaping 
the fate of individual children. Traditionally, in fact, the Preamble to an Act may be 
consulted in only two instances: where the provision to be interpreted is ambiguous 
or where the intention of the legislature is that the wide language used is required in 
some way to be limited.8 However, a Preamble may well play a valuable role in 
providing future judicial guidance in interpreting specific provisions of the Act and 
future outcomes at the level of the High Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal. This 
is borne out by the purposive interpretive approach adopted in the post-Constitution 
era where the courts have been more willing to interpret statutes in the light of their 
purposes.9 
However, in addition, the purpose of a statute or section is especially important in the 
context of the Constitution: both the statute’s purpose and effect are of use in 
determining its constitutionality.10 This is evident from the approach of the 
Constitutional Court in Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
                                                     
8
  De Ville JR Constitutional and statutory interpretation (Interdoc Consultants (Pty) Ltd Cape Town 
2000) 147. 
9
  See for instance MV Golden North Governor and Bank of Scotland v Fund Constituting the 
Proceeds of the Judicial Sale of the MV Golden North (Maritime Technical Co Ltd Intervening) 
1999 (1) SA 144 (D) 152. 
10 
 De Ville (n 10) 249. 
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Development and Others,11 where the Court stated that "government’s objective in 
enacting legislation is relevant to determining its validity in the face of constitutional 
challenge. It does not of course determine what the statute means". 12  
As ‘academic activists’ we must hold the view that the Preamble is not insignificant 
and that it can play a role in the future interpretation of the Child Justice Act. 
Whether or not this will in fact occur remains to be seen.  
As to the second question, if the actual provisions of the law will achieve all of the 
goals set out, that is an issue on which commentators may differ, depending on their 
point of view. The provision in section 77(4) that children may in certain 
circumstances be sentenced to a period of 25 years imprisonment would attract 
international disapproval, and arguably offends the principle of deprivation of liberty 
for the shortest appropriate period of time.13 But the legislation makes extensive 
provision for diversion, providing a clear legal framework for ‘measures other than 
criminal procedures’ as required by the UNCRC’s article 40(3). However, a full 
discussion of this theme lies outside the scope of this paper.14 
The Preamble gives some expression, it is conceded, to indigenous values, insofar 
as the harsh treatment of children in conflict with the law under apartheid is 
recognised, the intention to comply with the commitments of the African Children’s 
Charter is stated,15 and the introduction of the principles of restorative justice is 
featured as a key aim.  
However, of far more legal significance, we aver, are sections 2 and 3, detailing 
respectively the "objectives of the act" and the "guiding principles", which elaborate 
                                                     
11 
 2009 ZACC 18. 
12 
 Par 22. Note that this statement is made in the context of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) 
Amendment Act 2007 and not the Child Justice Act. 
13 
 Section 28(1)(g) of the Constitution and Article 37(b) of the UNCRC. 
14 
 See, for one view, Wakefield L "South Africa’s Compliance with the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and other International Instruments: Does the new Child Justice Act 75 
of 2008 Truly Comply?" in The Children's Convention at 21: The Rights of the Child come of 
Age? 18 – 20 June 2010 University of Ulster (Magee Campus) Northern Ireland (copy on file with 
the authors). 
15 
 And the African Children’s Charter in turn has a unique provision on the situation of children 
under apartheid, which was still in force at the time that the Charter was drafted. The provisions 
of both the Charter and the UNCRC are, in addition to their formative influence as recorded in the 
Preamble, also guiding principles in the application of the Act. They are referred to directly in 
section 3(i) as well. 
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more clearly upon the purpose and aims of the legislation. The authors could not find 
clear and principled guidance on the role of such provisions as "objectives" and 
"principles" in the evolution of the statutory interpretation of an Act in the modern era. 
Justice Cameron’s cited dictum in Centre for Child Law (supra) seems to indicate 
that there might be some disagreement as to the weight of government’s stated 
objectives in the interpretative process.   
2.2 The objectives of the Act 
The objectives clause, scrutinised closely, restates much of the Preamble in another 
way. Hence, providing for the special treatment of children, contributing to safer 
communities, encouraging children to become law abiding adults, preventing harsh 
treatment in the conventional criminal justice system (and so forth) feature in a 
different form, but cover essentially the same territory. One objective which is framed 
more strongly in the body of the law (as against the Preamble) is that continued in 
section 2(e): 
To promote co-operation between government departments, and 
between government departments and the non-governmental sector and 
civil society, to ensure an integrated and holistic approach in the 
implementation of this Act.  
The most important section for the purposes of the present discussion is section 
2(b), which states the commitment to ubuntu. This objective is couched in the 
following terms: 
 To promote the spirit of ubuntu in the child justice system through – 
i Fostering a child’s sense of dignity and worth; 
ii Reinforcing children’s respect for human rights and the 
fundamental freedoms of others by holding children accountable 
for their actions and safe-guarding the interest of victims and the 
community; 
iii Supporting reconciliation by means of a restorative justice 
response; and 
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iv Involving parents, families, victims and, where appropriate, other 
members of the community affected by the crime in procedures 
in terms of this Act in order to encourage the reintegration of 
children. 
It has been stated that the meaning of ubuntu is extraordinarily difficult to convey in 
Western language.16 The first and most well-known judicial expression of the 
concept is that articulated in S v Makwanyane and Another17 insofar as the court 
said that ubuntu "envelops the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, 
human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity, in its fundamental 
sense it denotes humanity and morality".18 Other philosophers have highlighted "the 
spirit of community, mutual support, sharing, interconnectedness and respect for one 
another" that ubuntu signifies. 19 The Constitutional Court has also confirmed the 
critical role ubuntu plays in the South African Constitution. Mokgoro J states "[i]n our 
constitutional democracy the basic constitutional value of human dignity relates 
closely to ubuntu or botho, an idea based on deep respect for the humanity of 
another".20 This is closely echoed by Sachs J later in the judgment where he states 
"Ubuntu - botho is more than a phrase to be invoked from time to time to add a 
gracious and affirmative gloss to a legal finding already arrived at. It is intrinsic to 
and constitutive of our constitutional culture".21  
 
The further significance of the Dikoko judgment is that Sachs J succinctly describes 
four elements of restorative justice, thereby establishing what the Constitutional 
Court understands by the concept. These four elements are encounter, reparation, 
reintegration and participation.22 Skelton notes that in the earlier case of Port 
                                                     
16 
 Keevy I "Ubuntu versus the core values of the South African constitution" 2009 Journal for 
Juridical Science 32. 
17
  1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
18 
 At par 308, per Mokgoro, J. 
19 
 Keevy  (n18) 33. 
20 
 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) at para 68 per Mokgoro J 
21 
 At para 113. 
22
  At para 114. Sachs J elaborates on each of these elements: encounter enables victims and 
offenders to talk about the hurt caused; reparation focuses on "repairing the harm that has been 
done rather than doling out punishment"; reintegration "depends on the achievement of a mutual 
respect for and mutual commitment to one another"; and participation "presupposes a less formal 
encounter between the parties that allows other people close to them to participate". More 
recently this theoretical basis for restorative justice was used by one of the amicus curiae in its 
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Elizabeth Municipality,23 although Sachs didn’t specifically refer to the concept of 
restorative justice he nonetheless promoted some of the key elements he later 
identified in the Dikoko judgment, thereby confirming the centrality of these elements 
to the notion of restorative justice.24  
 
Returning to the notion of ubuntu, the Child Justice Act provides a significant 
legislative statement of the concept. Firstly, insofar as the Child Justice Act is 
concerned, section 2(b) quoted above clearly demonstrates that the notion of ubuntu 
was not introduced in a vacuum, as the sub-sections of section 2(e) are in fact an 
explanation of what the legislature means by the word in the context of the child 
justice system. To extrapolate, the "theory of ubunt"’ that underlies section 2(b) is 
characterised, first, by an understanding of the rootedness of child offenders in their 
families and communities (the expressions umuntu, ngumuntu, ngabantu are 
apposite). Any resolution to the matter or outcome of the offence must therefore take 
the child’s family and community context into account. Individualised approaches to 
offending (another well-worn mantra in child justice advocacy) are not incorrect, as 
long as such individualised approaches are characterised by their "whole person" 
model of understanding of the individual (in social science theory described as the 
micro- and meso levels of social development).25 Another way of looking at this issue 
relates to the communitarianism which is said to differentiate ubuntu and African 
philosophy from Western thought. Sections 2(b)(ii) and (iii) are probably indicative of 
this dimension. It is apparent, more clearly, in section 2(b)(iv), which reinforces the 
notion that one’s personhood depends on one’s relationship with others.  
Secondly, the underlying theory encapsulated in section 2 seems to postulate that 
criminal justice processes and procedures adopted must be oriented towards values 
that are by definition held to be characteristic of ubuntu. These are easily identified in 
the section where it is stated that ubuntu requires the fostering of a child’s sense of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
submissions to the Constitutional Court in the matter of Le Roux and others v Dey and others 
CCT 45/2010 in the context of a civil claim of damages against children.   
23
  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
24 
 Skelton A "Face to face: Sachs on restorative justice" 2010(25) SA Public Law 94. 
25 
 See, for instance, Bronfenbrenner U The Ecology of Human Development: Experiments by 
Nature and Design (Harvard University Press USA 1979).  
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dignity and worth, and reinforcement of the child’s respect for the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of others. This broad injunction clearly covers more than 
merely the end result of a criminal process (eg sanction or sentence) but spans the 
entire gamut of dealings with the child in the justice system, i.e. from the first contact 
(or arrest) throughout the procedure.  
Thirdly, the Child’s Justice Act’s ubuntu theory steers away from the revenge, 
banishment, exclusion or retaliation/expiation tradition of criminal procedure under 
African law which Mutwa, quoted by Keevy, describes as notable characteristics.26 
Crucially the version propagated in the Child Justice Act accords with the well known 
dimensions of reconciliation and restorative justice, both of which are referred to 
directly among the objects of ubuntu in section 2(b)(iii). Restoration of the equilibrium 
as a goal is also evident in the wording of section 2(b)(ii) insofar as it refers to 
safeguarding the interest of victims, and section 2(b)(iv), which highlights the 
interests of the community affected by the crime (our emphasis). Neither 
reconciliation nor restorative justice harmonise well with an approach that proceeds 
from the premise that a child can get away with a crime or simply undertake a minor 
or insignificant penance ("just say sorry"). Fundamentally, both involve a deep level 
of personal accountability in restoring the status quo:  
as an outcast the offender loses not only his status in the 
community but also his ability to participate in communal activities 
until his offence is purged and his status restored.27 
It is therefore a form of justice which is frequently credited as requiring more of the 
transgressor than conventional Western justice models, which offer many avenues 
for watering down or mitigating the acceptance of personal responsibility (plea 
bargains or the downgrading of charges, agreed sentences, including fully 
suspended sentences on non-onerous conditions). It is also a form of justice that the 
Constitutional Court has endorsed for these reasons, as seen most recently in the 
case of M v S (Centre for Child Law Amicus Curiae28) where Sachs J discusses 
correctional supervision as a sentence that allows for restorative justice: "Central to 
                                                     
26 
 Keevy (n 18) 19. 
27 
 Keevy (n 18) 29. 
28 
 2007 (12) BCLR 1312 (CC). 
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the notion of restorative justice is the recognition of the community rather than the 
criminal justice agencies as the prime site of crime control".29 
Fourthly, it is argued that the ubuntu of the Child Justice Act leaves out (or glosses 
over) some important dimensions of ubuntu, thereby also shaping the theoretical 
framework in which it is to be understood and interpreted in terms of this Act. Two 
notable issues can be cited. First, a reference to the dimension of collective 
shaming, which is arguably important to the context within which ubuntu can be said 
to have been furthered, is missing. Subjective shame, along with compensation to 
the victim, are frequent actors on the ubuntu stage, because of the capacity they 
hold to achieve (or regain) the necessary equilibrium at community level, which 
balance has been disturbed by the commission of the offence.  
Collective shame serves as an effective deterrent for potential offenders 
as it does not only affect the offender but also shames his peer group 
and family who have to take collective responsibility for him.30 
It could be countered that the mere reference to the involvement of the affected 
community (section 2(b)(iv)) gives a clue that shaming is intended; but this is not 
expressly mentioned nor is it a necessary consequence of the involvement of others 
in the child justice system’s envisaged processes.31   
Secondly, allied to thisis the absence of a public32 facet to the stated conception of 
ubuntu. Obviously there are good reasons for this. The child’s right to privacy under 
standard international human (child) rights law overrides the interests of the 
community and South African society in a public acceptance of accountability. 
                                                     
29 
 At para 62. For a thorough discussion of the case see Skelton A "Severing the Umbilical Cord: A 
subtle jurisprudential shift regarding children and their primary caregivers" 2008 Constitutional 
Court Review. 
30
  Keevy (n 18) 29-30. 
31 
 Maxwell G  and Morris A  "What is the place of Shame in Restorative Justice",  in Zehr H and 
Toews B (eds) Critical Issues in Restorative Justice (Criminal Justice Press and Willan 
Publishing Monsey 2004),  deny that shaming is an essential part of restorative justice. Skelton 
(2006) (n 3 above) 109, concurs with this view, stating that the concept of "encounter" during 
which the offender faces his or her victim in the presence of significant others suffices to achieve 
the objectives of ensuring that the offender is forced to confront his or her wrongdoing.  
32
  An acknowledged strength of the South African TRC process (widely heralded as a best practice 
example of  restorative justice ) was its public dimension, allowing society at large to experience 
either first hand or otherwise the confessions of perpetrators of condemned acts and at the same 
time enabling them to expiate publically their sins.   
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However, the point is thereby reinforced that the Child Justice Act contains within its 
provisions a particular view of ubuntu, namely one without an overtly (or 
expressively) public face. 
2.3 Guiding principles   
Turning from the objects section, the final source for claims to Africanisation that will 
be adduced here are contained in the section dealing with guiding principles, section 
3. Section 3 contains nine principles, ranging from the requirement of proportionality 
to the requirement of child and family participation in proceedings under the Act.  
The "Africanisation" argument is based, first, on section 3(e) which provides that 
every child should be treated in a manner which takes into account his or her cultural 
values and beliefs. Other principles are clearly relevant to our context: ensuring that 
children lacking family support or educational or employment opportunities have 
equal access to services (section 3(h)); the participation of parents guardians and 
appropriate adults (defined as any member of a child’s family or a child’s care-giver) 
(section 3(g));  the requirement that unreasonable delay (endemic in African criminal 
justice systems) be avoided (section 3(f)); and the reference to children’s obligations, 
reflecting article 31 of the African Children’s Charter (section 3(i)).33  
It remains, then, to consider the extent which the substantive provisions of the Child 
Justice Act develop an ubuntu approach, in the endeavour to plumb the merits of 
referring to ubuntu as an object of the Act. 
3. Diversion and restorative sentencing in the Child Justice Act 
Fulfilment of the promise to provide legislatively for diversion, first made in the Issue 
Paper on Juvenile Justice in 1997, has taken place. Chapter 8 of the Act contains an 
elaborate chapter on the topic, entrenching mechanisms for the referral of cases 
away from criminal courts and the known ills of the accoutrements thereof (detention 
in police cells, contamination of child offenders through contact with more hardened 
                                                     
33
  The inclusion of children’s duties is a unique feature of the African Children’s Charter, not found 
in supranational human rights treaties such as the UNCRC. See too section 16 of the Children’s 
Act 38 of 2005. 
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adult criminals, undifferentiated sentencing regimes which pay little heed to youth 
development, over-emphasis on incarceration, etc).34  
3.1 Diversion  
The nature, scope, merits, risks and challenge relative to diversion  - channelling 
children away from court-based processes to programmes and developmental 
measures – have been well described in both academic work, policy documents and 
lay sources such as the websites of service providers for example NICRO and 
KHULISA.35 The history of diversionary service provisioning is one that is still taking 
shape,36 and most recent developments include the publication of a national policy 
framework for the accreditation of diversion service providers37 which will guide the 
registration and monitoring of social work and related services to children diverted 
from the criminal justice system via this Act, and a number of other documents.38 
The Act itself provides an independent set of objectives to guide the application of 
diversion. These cover territory that is by now fairly well worn, including promoting 
reconciliation, encouraging the child to be accountable for the offence, redressing 
the harm caused, providing an opportunity for victim participation and compensation, 
preventing stigmatisation of the child and promoting the child’s dignity and wellbeing 
and the development of his or her feeling of self-worth and ability to contribute to 
society (section 51(a)–(k)). As is the case with the sentencing objectives discussed 
below, ubuntu is not expressly mentioned. 
                                                     
34 
 Sloth-Nielsen (n 3) chapter 5, describes these negative aspects of conventional criminal justice 
systems for children.  
35 
 For a summary of relevant literature see Galllinetti (2008) (n 3 above) chapter 6, which includes 
literature on restorative justice such as Maepa T(ed) Beyond Retribution, Prospects for 
Restorative Justice in South Africa: Monograph 111 (Institute for Security Studies 2005) and 
Steyn F Review of South African Innovations in Diversion and Reintegration of Youth at Risk 
(Open Society Foundation for South Africa 2005). 
36 
 See Sloth-Nielsen J "A short history of time" in Gallinetti J et al Child Justice: Children’s Rights 
under Construction (The Child Justice Alliance and the Open Society Foundation for South Africa 
Cape Town 2006). 
37
  Department of Social Development, 2010. 
38 
 Practice Guidelines for the Child Justice Act, also issued by the Department of Social 
Development (2009), the National Policy Framework on the Child Justice Act developed by the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (May 2010) and National Prosecuting 
Authority diversion directives developed under section 97(4)(a)(i) (March 2010) elaborate the 
Act’s scheme in abundant (paper) detail. 
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The real novelty in relation to substantive law is the diversion options, provided for in 
two levels in section 52.39 The first area for mention is the group of six new diversion 
orders, elaborated by means of a series of definitions. Without stretching a point, 
elements of ubuntu can be discerned in some of these orders. For instance, a family 
time order (an order issued requiring the child to spend a specified number of hours 
with his or her family) takes umuntu, ngumuntu, ngabantu to a new level. Similarly, a 
good behaviour order, requiring a child to abide by an agreement made between the 
child and his or her family to comply with certain standards of behaviour would 
accord well with African values, which recognise the respect of elders and the 
centrality of the cohesion of the family in African custom and social norms. Even a 
positive peer association order - requiring a child to associate with persons or peers 
who can contribute to the child’s positive behaviour or to refrain from associating with 
certain specified persons or peers - is reminiscent of the benign guidance of elders 
and kin in the extended family, in which communality and interdependence are 
embedded. 
Then in what is the longest substantive provision in the Act, section 53 names these 
and an array of further avenues available for consideration. Thus the possibility of an 
oral or written apology (section 53(3)(a)), symbolic restitution to a specified 
person(s), group of persons or community, charity or welfare organisation or 
institution (section 53(3)(i)), restitution of a specified object to a specified victim(s), 
where the object concerned can be returned or restored (section 53(3)(m)), provision 
of some service or benefit by the child to a specified victim(s) or community service 
(sections 53(3)(n) and (o)), together with the new diversion "orders" establish a 
smorgasbord of tantalising possibilities to tailor a "sanction" to suit the 
circumstances. 
Adding to this menu, the level two options which are available for children charged 
with more serious offences include all of those listed above, as well as more onerous 
                                                     
39
  The idea of dividing the diversion options into different levels originated in the SALRC draft of the 
Bill. The three levels signified diversion responses differing in proportion in relation to the 
seriousness of the offence, and depending on whether or not the child had previously been a 
beneficiary of diversion. Each level of options is linked to the Schedules listing the applicable 
offences. During the parliamentary process, the number of levels was reduced from three to two 
in an effort to simplify the system.   
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choices for the discerning magistrate: compulsory attendance at a vocational, 
educational or therapeutic centre (section 53(4)(b)), referral to intensive therapy to 
treat or manage problems that have caused the offending behaviour (section 
53(4)(c)), and placement under the supervision of a probation officer on specific 
conditions. These certainly do not reflect anything particularly "African", especially as 
they clearly contemplate residential confinement, which is incommensurable with an 
African tradition that eschews detention and institutionalisation.40 However, these 
options were intended to be reserved for the more serious offences (see section 54 
entitled "selection of diversion option", which spells out the framework guiding the 
use of level two diversion options). A brief discussion of the debates which led to 
these (arguably) more intrusive diversion options and a more stringent diversion 
regime overall is provided in section 3 below. 
The Act returns to restorative justice terminology in section 55, which is premised on 
the recognition that individual diversion options, programmes, measures and 
conditions may take on any hue. Hence, for reasons of maximising consistency, 
constitutional compliance, developmentally appropriate interventions and so forth, a 
series of "minimum standards" for diversion is mandated. These include that the 
diversion programmes must "include a restorative justice element which aims at 
healing relationships, including the relationship with the victim" (section 55(2)(b)), 
that they must include an element which seeks to ensure that the child understands 
the impact of his or her behaviour on others, including the victim(s) of the offence 
(section 55(2)(c)), and must "involve parents, appropriate adults, or guardians, if 
applicable" (section 55(2)(h)).41 
Our assessment is that the substantive provisions on diversion are a true 
embodiment of restorative principles, and that they indeed give effect to the African 
values espoused in the Preamble and objectives to the Act. Hence, we suggest that 
the claim that the Act is restorative in approach is indeed borne out, if regard be had 
to the abovementioned provisions.  
                                                     
40
  See for instance Pete S "A brief history of human rights in the prisons of Africa" in Sarkin J (ed) 
Human Rights in African Prisons (HSRC Press Cape Town, 2008) where it is pointed out that 
penal incarceration as we know it today was largely unknown in pre-colonial Africa.   
41 
 These minimum standards are additional to the accreditation standards mandated by section 56 
of the Act. 
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It remains to be seen, though, if the same can be said of the sentencing provisions of 
the Act. It is to this analysis that the paper now turns.       
3.2 Sentencing  
The sentencing chapter, as with the Act as a whole and diversion in particular, has a 
specific section that sets out the objectives of sentencing under the Act. Section 
69(1)(e) reaffirms that imprisonment is a measure of last resort and should be 
imposed only for the shortest appropriate period of time, while the rest of section 
69(1) emphasises an individualised response for the child, a balancing of interests 
between the child and society, and the need for reintegration of the child into the 
community. Importantly, section 69(1) reinforces the need for children to be "held 
accountable and understand the implications of the harm caused" – a basic tenet of 
restorative justice theory. That restorative justice is a crucial consideration in 
sentencing, too, is underscored by section 69(2), which specifically encourages a 
restorative justice approach. Ubuntu again does not feature in this section eo 
nomine.  
The question here is if the restorative sentencing regime is therefore abstracted from 
the Africanised introduction to the Act. Our response to this is in the negative, based 
on the clear elaboration of the underlying principles which seem to be common both 
to restorative justice and to the philosophy of ubuntu: accountability for the harm 
caused; balancing the circumstances of the child with the interests of society; 
promoting family reintegration; and ensuring that the supervision, guidance and 
services provided to the child as part of a sentence assist with reintegration (section 
69(1)(a) –(e)).  
Significantly, for the first time in South African legislative history, the Act - in section 
70 - provides a means whereby the impact of the offence on the victim may be 
placed before the sentencing court by means of a victim impact statement. This 
inclusion was deliberated on in Parliament, and the Portfolio Committee on Justice 
and Constitutional Development envisaged the section as a clear endorsement of 
restorative justice and the need to afford victims a more prominent status in the 
criminal justice system. The important relationship between restorative justice and 
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the interest of victims was emphasised in the Dikoko case (albeit in the context of a 
civil claim for damages), where Sachs J talks of vindication.42 Writing on the case, 
Skelton elaborates: 
What victims most often seek through a justice process is vindication.  
This is an instinctive emotional response in human beings, and is often 
misunderstood as a need for vengeance. In a successful restorative  
justice process many victims experience a validation of their traumatic 
experience, and this often commences or advances their healing.43 
 
However, the section may well prove to be less promising in practice than the theory 
would suggest. Firstly, the use of victim impact statements is discretionary, thereby 
somewhat undermining the intended purpose of their inclusion in the Act. Secondly, 
the use of victim impact statements is possible only in cases involving children. This 
in turn raises the spectre of a challenge based on the fact that, guiding principle 3(b) 
notwithstanding,44 this part of the sentencing regime in the Act provides an 
essentially more punitive system for children than the criminal procedure prevailing 
for adult offenders.   
Whereas the guiding principles for sentencing do not specifically refer to ubuntu, as 
already pointed out, the actual sentencing options detailed in the Act must also be 
reviewed. In so far as section 72 (1) provides that any of the diversion options can be 
used as sentencing options, so-called "community based sentences" therefore are 
aligned with the ideals common to both restorative justice and ubuntu, as argued 
above relative to diversion. But this alone is not indicative that sentencing under the 
Act is reflective of a truly restorative approach. 
                                                     
42 
 At paras 109–112.  
43 
 Skelton (note 26). 
44 
 Section 3(b) provides that a child must not be treated more severely than an adult would have 
been treated in the same circumstances. Whilst this paper does not detail all of the strains of 
restorative justice theories that abound, it must be noted that a strongly punitive victim’s lobby 
forms one subset of the proponents of a more restorative justice system: see Skelton (2006) (n 3 
above) 431. The possibility of strongly punishment-oriented and victim-influenced sentencing 
decisions for children is therefore not remote.   
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Section 73 is vital to our argument in this regard. Entitled "restorative justice 
sentences", it provides for referral to a family group conference, to victim offender 
mediation and to "any other restorative justice process".  The detail as to how this 
might occur is set out earlier in the Act, insofar as these mechanisms may also be 
used as diversion options. The difference when they are utilised in the sentencing 
process relates to how the outcomes may affect the sentence imposed. Where used 
as a sentencing aid, the plans formulated at a family group conference, or agreed to 
at a victim offender mediation may be confirmed, amended or replaced by a court 
(section 73(2)). Section 73(3) emphasises that a court may impose any other 
sentence, provided that the reasons for replacing the plan of the family group 
conference (or similar process) with that sentence are recorded. 
Some will flag this section as embodying the essence of a restorative approach as 
promised originally in the Preamble and objectives, especially given the title of the 
section. In addition, the flexibility of the option, providing for the possibility that the 
sentencing outcomes can be set by a collective dialogue involving the victim, the 
victim’s family, the community and the offender, illustrates a communitarian 
approach that is clearly indicative of the notion of ubuntu.  
However, it could also be argued that the section offends against sentencing practice 
in that it creates a mechanism for divesting the sentencing officer of the immediate 
need to formulate a sentence, displacing the "development of a plan" to another 
setting. Even if the restorative dimensions are successfully achieved there (remotely 
as it were) – i.e. the acceptance of accountability, readiness to make good the harm 
caused, involvement of the victim and his or her interests in the identification of 
reintegrative measures – the sentencing officer is free to accept or reject whatever 
comes to the table in the form of a plan. Moreover, the sentencing officer is not 
expected to play a role in the family group conference or mediation itself, as the 
responsibility for convening the event(s) is "outsourced" to non-governmental 
organisations or to probation officers. Hence, if any ubuntu or restorative outcome 
does in fact occur, this will take place well outside the courtroom, far from the 
purview of the criminal justice system, and beyond any means of control of the usual 
actors (magistrates and prosecutors). The role of the court in providing oversight is 
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admittedly procedurally provided for; but then the scheme of the Act makes it clear 
that the court is still free to decide whether or not to refer such a matter at all and, 
upon receipt of the recommendations, whether to abide by them or not.  
Is this then a restorative justice response? Ultimately the answer is yes, but what the 
legislation provides is an alternative methodology for arriving at the sentencing 
disposition, which may be debated in future. And if the process of sentencing 
envisaged in this alternative methodology is called into question, such doubt may 
impact on whether the sentence can be regarded as having truly produced 
restoration or promoted ubuntu.  
4. "Just say sorry"? 
Is the Act, then, too lenient on account of its endorsement of a restorative justice 
approach and overall objective of fostering a sense of ubuntu? That the Act would be 
perceived in this way was one of the reasons that the Child Justice Alliance was 
formed in 2001, to ensure an accurate understanding of the nature and purpose of 
the legislation. While the anticipated outcry about the proposed legislation did not 
materialise, the passage of the Child Justice Bill through parliament was not easy, 
precisely on account of the Portfolio Committee Chairman De Lange’s concern that 
diversion for certain children charged with serious offences was not appropriate. 
Instead of considering diversion in the context of the relevant legal principles and its 
positioning within the entire scheme of the legislation, the Committee Chairman 
expressed dismay at the fact that the existing diversion programmes were 
inappropriate (in content and duration) for certain children charged with rape and 
murder for instance.45 Subsequent changes were made to the Bill and these have 
ultimately had a significant effect on the final version of the Act and have assisted, to 
an extent, in providing a response to the charge that the legislation is too lenient.   
In finalising the Act, the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional 
Development accepted that all children would have access to and be eligible for 
diversion. However, the original concerns about diversion being available for certain 
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 One of the authors was present at all of the parliamentary hearings on the Child Justice Bill both 
in 2003 and 2008 and has personal notes on the deliberations and decisions made in the 
Portfolio Committee.  
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children charged with very serious offences had an impact on the way in which the 
provisions on diversion were ultimately fashioned, in particular on the manner in 
which diversion is to be considered and effected. A number of pre-conditions have to 
be met In order for a child to qualify for diversion, such as acknowledgement of 
accountability, consent to diversion by the child, and the existence of a prima facie 
case against the child (section 52(1)). In addition, the prosecution must consider the 
views of the victim and consult with the investigating officer before deciding on 
whether to divert or not (section 52(2). For children charged with schedule 3 offences 
– the most serious - only the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions in a province 
may decide to divert (a non-delegable power) and only if there are exceptional 
circumstances: the victim musts have been afforded an opportunity to express a 
view on whether the matter should be diverted or not and on the proposed diversion 
option; and the investigating officer must have been consulted (section 52(3)). 
Finally, the Act introduced maximum timeframes for all diversion orders (up to 4 
years in duration) (section 53 (5) and (6)); diversion orders must be monitored for 
compliance (section 57); and there are extensive provisions for the accreditation of 
diversion service providers and programmes (sections 56 and 97) – quite apart from 
the substantive minimum norms and standards developed for diversion programmes. 
The overall effect of the changes to the original Bill is that diversion is now tightly 
regulated by the provisions of the Act. While all children are eligible to be considered 
for diversion, whether they will be diverted or not is dependent on a range of quite 
stringent conditions being met. Furthermore, if children charged with serious 
offences are diverted, the diversion options available for selection, the time frames 
for which orders may be imposed, and ensuring compliance therewith are all far 
more burdensome than originally conceived by the South African Law Reform 
Commission and contained in the Bill introduced to Parliament in 2002.  
This "new" system of diversion has been subject to some criticism.46 However, it can 
also be said that Parliament saw the need for diversion (and restorative justice as a 
whole) to be a credible system, one which would be acceptable to the South African 
public given the constant calls for government to be more vigilant and pro-active in 
                                                     
46
  See for instance Skelton A and Gallinetti J "A Long and Winding Road: The Child Justice Bill, 
Civil Society and Advocacy 2008 SA Crime Quarterly 3-9.  
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combating crime. The concerns of the Parliamentarians cannot be discounted given 
the visceral reaction of the public against children who commit serious offences, as 
has been seen for instance in the Baby Jordan murder case, the Eugene 
Terreblance murder case, and the case of the 12-year-old Kwa-Zulu Natal girl who 
commissioned the murder of her grandmother.47 The reworking of the legislation into 
its present form has arguably resulted from the legislature’s desire for the Act not to 
be seen to be too lenient – an attempt to be true to the principles and objectives of 
the Act, while ensuring that children are held appropriately accountable for their 
actions.     
5. The Child Justice Act as an Africanised statute? 
In the Port Elizabeth Municipality case Justice Sachs remarks on the role of the 
courts in giving effect to ubuntu in the context of evictions: 
The inherited injustices at the macro level will inevitably make it 
difficult for the courts to ensure immediate present day equity at the 
micro level. The judiciary cannot of itself correct all the systemic 
unfairness to be found in our society. Yet it can at least soften and 
minimise the degree of injustice and inequity... 48 
Previously he had referred to the need (albeit in the context of the Prevention of 
Illegal Evictions Act) for the court to infuse elements of "grace and compassion" into 
the formal structures of the law. He suggests that courts are  
called upon to balance competing interests in a principled way and 
promote the constitutional vision of a caring society based on good 
neighbourliness and shared concern.... the spirit of ubuntu, part of the 
deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population, suffuses the 
whole constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a 
communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, 
which is nothing if not a structured, institutionalised and operational 
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 DPP Kwa-Zulu Natal v P 2006(1) SACR 243 (SCA). 
48 
 At para 38. 
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declaration in our evolving new society of the need for human 
interdependence, respect and concern.49 
Strands of these lines of reasoning are no less applicable in the child justice sphere 
as well. Firstly, in the context of an apartheid history in which the majority of child 
offenders  - the largest number of whom were Black - were treated as criminals in an 
unforgiving and punitive justice system, as referred to in the Preamble to the Child 
Justice Act, one finds analogies to the inequities of housing distribution wrought by 
South Africa’s divided past.  
Secondly, this sphere of judicial concern is no less concerned with the balancing of 
competing interests, those of the victim and of society. Society cannot let misdeeds 
go unnoticed, while the child offender requires the development and application of 
responsive and useful measures aimed at ensuring future maturation into law 
abiding adulthood. It goes without saying that child offenders are frequently drawn 
from the most vulnerable and marginalised groups. They are the children of broken 
families, they live in gang-infested neighbourhoods, they are without satisfactory 
adult role models, they themselves have been victimised from early in life, they often 
have proven psychological and psychiatric deficits, low achievement rates at school 
and so forth.50 Justice Sachs’ references to a (legal) system which "softens and 
minimises... injustice and inequity" are rather apposite in this regard as well. 
Indeed, the context within which children face criminal charges in South Africa has 
already been eloquently articulated in constitutional jurisprudence: 
The Constitution draws this sharp distinction between children and 
adults not out of sentimental considerations but for practical 
reasons relating to children’s greater physical and psychological 
vulnerability. Children’s bodies are generally frailer and their ability 
to make choices generally more constricted than those of adults. 
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 Port Elizabeth Municipality, para 37. 
50 
 South Africa is not in any way unique in regard to offender profiles. For research done on 
reintegration in South Africa see for instance Muntingh L A Societal Responsibility: The Role of 
Civil Society Organisations in Prisoner Support, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (Civil Society 
Prison Reform Initiative and Institute for Security Studies Pretoria 2009) and Muntingh L Ex-
prisoners’ Views in Imprisonment and Re-Entry (Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative and 
Community Law Centre Cape Town 2010).   
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They are less able to protect themselves, more needful of 
protection and less resourceful in self-maintenance than adults. 
These considerations take acute effect when society imposes 
criminal responsibility and passes sentence on child offenders.51 
Thirdly, in relation to neighbourliness and shared concern (the essence of a 
communitarian philosophy) as highlighted by Justice Sachs, the object, principles, 
and substantive provisions of the Child Justice Act elaborate these adequately to lay 
the basis for the assertion that these, too, provide the context of an ubuntu-oriented 
child justice system. The role of families and the community of concern to the child is 
consistently well articulated in the Act, for instance via the novel diversion orders we 
have described.  
But the excerpts quoted do in fact shape, perhaps obliquely, the primary concern of 
our analysis in this section, namely the application of the Act at an operational level. 
The high profile cases usually associated with juvenile justice, and which tend to 
dominate media attention – the baby Jordan Case, the Eugene Terreblanche case, 
and DPP v P, etc – constitute a miniscule proportion of the overall number of cases 
which will be dealt with in accordance with the precepts of the new Act.  Further, a 
representative sample they are not, being skewed towards the most serious and 
attention-grabbing crimes. The vast bulk of children will be appearing in lower courts, 
charged with far more mundane infractions.52 Thus the real impact of the restorative 
justice and ubuntu orientation of the Child Justice Act will emerge only from the day-
to-day practice of practitioners in the system, largely in the lower courts. 
In a presentation to magistrates in 1999, one of the authors referred to the need for 
engagement, indeed for criminal justice personnel to "bust a gut" to put flesh on the 
bones of the provisions, such as those we have outlined. This was, it was averred, 
                                                     
51
  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice, par 26 and 27. 
52
  It is to be noted that there is no clear benchmark of how many children are expected to be 
channelled through child justice processes annually. Various guesstimates have been proffered, 
the most well known being around 100 000 children arrested per annum. These figures were 
presented at the Parliamentary hearings. The baseline study of the Child Justice Alliance (2007) 
gives an indication of the very wide range of non-serious or ordinary offences for which children 
appear in courts on a day to day basis. See Gallinetti J and Kassan D Research on the criminal 
justice system pertaining to children in three magisterial districts (Child Justice Alliance Cape 
Town 2007).  
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the underlying approach to judicial decision-making desired by the SALRC drafters. 
Operationalising the innovative diversion options discussed in section 2 above, and 
implementing on a routine basis restorative justice options such as referral to family 
group conferencing and victim/offender mediation, not to mention devising 
inspirational alternatives to the usually crude sentencing menu, are not going to be 
easy. For this actually to happen, both the substantive and procedural dimensions of 
the restorative design are going to require presiding officers (and to some extent 
prosecutors and probation officers) to be imaginative and thorough. They will have to 
delve deep into the individual child’s (and family’s and community’s) circumstances 
and explore behavioural change-oriented dispositions, whilst at the same time 
satisfying the communitarian and victim-centred goals of the ubuntu ideal. This 
represents an extended role for justice officials, going beyond the ordinary 
application of the black letter of the law, as was the case when the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was applicable to child offenders. It may take considerable 
effort for these officials to come to term with the ‘new approach’ contained in the 
Child Justice Act. 
However, it is the need for officials to think beyond the black letter of the law  that we 
believe is required for the Act to become a meaningful embodiment of an Africanised 
approach to criminal offending by children: otherwise, the risk exists that diversion 
and alternative sentencing will come to be seen only as a way for both children and 
criminal justice officials to profit from the non-punitive dimensions of the law,53 
without at the same time ensuring that the internalisation of accountability and 
accompanying reintegrative ideals are realised.    Therefore it is our assertion that 
the legislature has created an Africanised statute, based on the prominence given to 
restorative justice and ubuntu, but that for it to truly benefit the offender and the 
victim and community, the criminal justice system will have to embrace and 
operationalise this legislative intent.    
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 For an early account of how the child justice system might benefit court management by 
becoming an automatic convenience for the easy processing of cases through diverting them out 
of the system, see Sloth–Nielsen J, "The Business of Child Justice" in Burchell J and Erasmus A 
(eds), Criminal Justice in a New Society, Juta and Co. Ltd: Lansdowne, 2003. 
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